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Article 1

General Report
Individualism and Communitarianism
in Contemporary Legal Systems:
Tensions and Accommodations
Mary Ann Glendon, General Reporter*
Nothing, in my view, more deserves attention than the
intellectual and moral associations in America. American
political and industrial associations easily catch our eyes, but
the others tend not to be noticed. And even if we do notice
them we tend to misunderstand them. . . . However, we
should recognize that the latter are as necessary a s the former to the American people; perhaps more so.
Alexis de Tocquevillel

When the members of two comparative law associations
come together for a conference, the tacit assumption is that
comparative methods will advance the understanding of whatever questions are before the house. That assumption led to the
establishment of the first comparative law societies in France,
Germany, and England in the late nineteenth century, and it
presided over the founding of the International Association of
Legal Science in 1950 and the American Association for the
Comparative Study of Law in 1951. In their embrace of comparative methods, legal scholars were no different from their
counterparts in the other human sciences who took for granted
that serious research ought to include a comparative dimension. Emile Durkheim, for example, went so far as to claim that
"[clomparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology;
it is sociology i t ~ e l f . "F.W.
~ Maitland insisted that "[tlhe Eng* Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard University; President, International Association of Legal Science.
1. ALWS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA517 (J.P.Mayer ed. &
George Lawrence trans., Anchor Books 1969) (1966).
2. EmLE D m , THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
METHOD139 (George Catlin
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lish lawyer who knew nothing and cared nothing for any system but his own, hardly came in sight of the idea of legal historySn3
The question arises, however: Why, if the benefits of comparative methods are so substantial and obvious, has comparative law remained a relative backwater in the twentieth-century legal world? No doubt there are several reasons, including
language barriers and the great difficulty of achieving even
minimal competence in another legal system while keeping up
with developments in one's own. Circumstances i n the United
States, moreover, long made it easy for legal scholars to carry
on many types of research without casting their gaze beyond
national borders. In recent years, though, with unprecedented
global interdependence, and with commerce and communication
linking all regions of the earth, that posture has become increasingly untenable. As a result, international legal studies
are burgeoning to a degree that the founders of comparative
law organizations could scarcely have imagined. As we stand
on the verge of this new era, however, it is not altogether clear
what role comparative law will play in the legal science of the
future.
To many legal academics, "international legal studies"
means international business law, public international law,
area studies, and little else. The comparative enterprise seems
quaint and old-fashioned-except so far as foreign law knowledge can be deployed in the service of some immediate commercial or political objective. As for comparatists themselves, most
would admit we are in something of an identity crisis.
That we have reached such a stage should surprise no one.
Modern comparative law, after all, took shape in the late nineteenth century a t a time when differences among European
national legal systems in many areas were becoming more
accentuated than they had been in the more distant past or
than they are now.4 One of the main purposes of the first comparative law associations was therefore quite practical: to aid
national law reformers by studying the ways in which legislaed., Sarah Solovay & John H. Mueller trans., 8th ed. Free Press 1966) (1895).
W. MA~LAND,
Why the History of English Law Is Not Written, in
3. FREDERIC
488 (HAL. Fisher ed.,
THE COLLECTED
PAPERSOF FREDERICWILLIAM
1911).
4. See Gino Gorla & Luigi Moccia, A "Revisiting" of the Comparison between
143
"Continental Law" and "English Law" (16th-19th Century), 2 J. LEGALHIST.
(1981).
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tors of countries at comparable stages of social and economic
development were dealing with the novel problems associated
with urbanization and industrialization.
But there was always more to comparative law than that.
Comparative lawyers are intellectual cousins to sociologists
who have long known that drawing a line around a n area on a
map and calling it a national boundary does not capture the
full complexity of norm systems toward which the people inside
orient their conduct, or the differing contexts of habits, practices, and attitudes within which various mutually conditioning
norm systems operate. Many legal scholars, moreover, have
pursued comparative studies for the same reasons that scholars
in other disciplines routinely resort to comparative methods-for the sake of improved knowledge and understanding,
and as a way of critically evaluating their own theories and
hypotheses.5 The attraction of comparative law has never been
just the study of foreign law as such. It has also been the allure
of a glimpse into the origins of legal norms; the prospect of a
better understanding of the efficacy and limits of law; and the
hope of insight into the connections among law, behavior, ideas,
and power. In other words, comparative law belongs not only to
international legal studies, but to basic research in law.
The question remains concerning the place of comparatists,
with their peculiar set of practical and theoretical preoccupations, in the modern legal world--especially in the world envisioned by those who believe (as Thomas Reed Powell once put
it) that the particular gift of lawyers is to be able to think
about something that is connected t o something else without
thinking of what it is connected to.6 No doubt it is useful to
have lawyers around who think that way, just as it's useful for
a surgeon who is operating on the hip bone not to be thinking
about how the hip bone is connected to the thigh bone, and so
on. But neither medicine nor law can do without people who
study the functions, contexts, and connections that others, for
immediate practical purposes, may temporarily have to assume
away. And functions, contexts, and connections are much of
what comparative law is all about--whether at the national
level, the transnational level, o r in the capillaries of the legal

5.
See Friedrich Kubler, Rechtsvergleiclumg als Grundlagendisziplin der
Rechtswissenschaft, 32 JURI~NZEITUNG
113 (1977).
Rise and Fall of an Ab6. See Thurman W . Arnold, Criminal Attempts+-The
straction, 40 YALELJ. 53, 58 (1930) (noting Powell's observations).
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system, or in the institutions that compose the fine grain of
society.
In the law-saturated societies of the so-called advanced
nation^,^ we need now more than ever to know how legal
norms work in practice, how they interact with other norm
systems in various social contexts, what indirect effects they
generate, and what long-term consequences they may entail.
Comparative law is one way t o obtain that sort of knowledge. I t
is Justice Brandeis's 'laboratory" concept writ large? However,
the very features that furnish comparative methods with their
great power deprive them of wide appeal. Comparative law,
like basic research in any other field, takes a long apprenticeship; i t requires tehwork-not only with one's counterparts in
other legal systems, but with experts in related disciplines, especially those engaged in empirical research. Moreover, its
outcome is always uncertain; every worthwhile project entails
some risk of failure.
The relevance of these matters to the present conference is
that the theme of individualism and communitarianism required a certain willingness to take risks on the part of the
national reporters. When Cole Durham and I proposed that
exploratory and open-ended theme, rather than a precisely
defined topic, we were aware that we were inviting the reporters into relatively uncharted waters. Needless to say, we believed the risks would be offset by the chance of being able t o
demonstrate that cross-national and interdisciplinary teamwork can, in fact, f ~ K the
1 mission of the IALS t o promote the
development of legal science through the methods of compirative law.

When I say we knew the topic was risky, I mean that,
when this conference was in the earliest planning stage, we
knew this in the way that a teenager knows that fast driving
often produces accidents. We had our first concrete indication

7.

See Andreas Heldrich, The Deluge of Norms, 6 B.C.

& COMP. L.

REV.

377 (1983).

8. In New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.262 (1932), Justice Brandeis
called attention to the fact that one of the advantages of the American federal
system is that it can function as a Yaboratory" where "novel social and economic
experiments" can be tried by various jurisdictions "without risk to the rest of the
country." Id. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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of how risky it was when we tried to come up with a concise
description that would effectively communicate the general idea
of the project t o people from a wide range of legal systems.
From previous international conferences, we remembered the
danger of what language teachers call "false friends": words
that look the same but that have different meanings in different languages. There was, for example, a mysterious panel on
aeroglisseurs at the Caracas meeting of the International Academy-which many people did not attend because they doubted
whether there was really all that much to be said about the
law of glider^.^ Confusion reigned a t h o t h e r roundtable at
that same meeting, when half the national reporters came prepared to discuss adoption, while the other half were under the
impression that the subject was foster care.
In our efforts to avoid that sort of trap, we chose a description that was perhaps too general. So it seems appropriate to
begin this General Report by unpacking the themes we hoped
to evoke when we chose the title "Individualism and
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions
and Accommodations." I can think of no better way to do that
than to describe the genesis of the idea for this conference. In
1989, when Brigham Young University indicated its willingness
to host an IALS conference, a lively discussion was underway
in many parts of the world concerning the role that various
voluntary organizations-such as Solidarity in Poland, Civic
Forum in Czechoslovakia, and dozens of political discussion
groups in Hungary-had played in the downfall of statist socialism.1°
Among students of politics, this phenomenon reawakened
interest in the relationship between "society" and "state."
Vaclav Havel gave voice to the questions that were on many
minds: How did people who were to all appearances beaten
down, atomized, cynical, and apathetic find the strength to
embark on great projects of social and political renewal? Where
did "young people . . . who [had] never known any other system, find the source of their aspirations for truth, freedom of
thought, civic courage and civic foresight?"ll Havel's answer

9. The panel was actually an interesting discussion of the extent to which
hovercraft were subject to aviation or navigation laws.
10. See TIMOTHY G. ASH, THE USESOF ADVERSITY:ESSAYSON THE FATEOF
CENTRAL EUROPE47-49, 191, 203 (1989).
11. Vaclav Havel, New Year's Day Address, FOREIGNBROADCASTINGINFORMA-
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was, in part, that a certain humane and democratic inheritance
had been "dormant" but somehow kept alive in East European
societies.12 Speculation on how that inheritance was preserved
against all odds has led to a revival of interest in Tocqueville's
theory that communities of memory and mutual aid play essential, though insufficiently recognized, roles in underpinning
democratic forms of government.13
This is not the place to attempt a summary of the body of
thought that regards a flourishing associational life as crucial
to systems of self-government. I will just mention briefly five
points that are commonly made in that literature. First, and
most obviously, some types of associations can buttress individual freedom by serving to buffer the power and relativize
the ideology of the state.14 Second, several kinds of groups can
nurture the sorts of political skills that a republic requires in
its citizens as well as its statesmen. To Tocqueville, townships
and other participatory groups were little schools of citizenship
where people could form clear ideas about their rights and
duties, while acquiring habits of deliberation and mutual accommodation.15 Third, many of the American Founders counted on small-scale associations to serve as seedbeds for the republican virtues of moderation, self-restraint, sturdy independence of mind, and respect for the rights of others.16 It was
TION SERVICE, EASTERN EUROPE, 90-001,Jan. 2, 1990, at 9-10.
12. Id.
supra note 1, at 513-17; see also FRANCISFUKIJYAMA,
13. See TOCQUEVILLE,
THE END OF HIS~ORYAND THE LAST MAN at xix (1992); biARY ANN GLENDON,
RIGHTSTALK 109-44(1991); THOMAS
PANGLE,THE ENNOBLING
OF DEMOCRACY
10559 (1992); Thomas Pangle, The Constitution's Humun Vision, 86 PUB. INTEREST 77,
88-90 (1987).
Social theorists who have laid special emphasis on associational activity without
stressing its relation to democracy are: EMILEDURKHEIM,THE DMSION OF LABOR
IN SOCIETY 28-29 (George Simpson trans., Free Press 1933) (1893); PETER
KROPOTKIN, MUTUAL
AID (1972).
14. In our own day freedom of association has become a necessary guarantee
against the tyranny of the majority . . . . [Nlo countries need associations
more . . . than those with a democratic social state. I n aristocratic nations secondary bodies form natural associations which hold abuses of
power in check. In countries where such associations do not exist, if private people did not artificially and temporarily create something like
them, I see no other dike to hold back tyranny of whatever sort . . . .
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 192.
15. See id. at 62-70.
NOS. 55, at 346; 57, at 353 (James Madison), NO. 84,
16. See THE FEDERALIST
at 544 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also FORREST MCDONALD, NOWS ORDO SECLORUM:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSMTUTION
71-72, 190-91 (1985); GORDON
S. WOOD,THE RADICALISM
OF THE AMERICAN
REVO-
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mainly in family settings, schools, churches, and other closeknit communities, they believed, that citizens would develop
those qualities of intellect and character. Fourth, the habit of
accomplishing goals and projects through mutual aid has been
thought to prevent citizens from becoming too dependent on
government. When people habitually look to government for solutions to their problems, Tocqueville famously wrote, they
become subjects, but no longer citizens." Finally, in the twentieth century, as the liberal democracies have taken on extensive welfare responsibilities, many associations have attracted
yet another sort of interest-of a more practical and immediate
nature. Caught in the pinch between rising demands for services on the one hand and the limits of high taxation on the other,
policymakers are increasingly experimenting with the idea that
the state can promote the delivery of services such as health,
education, and child care more economically, efficiently, and
humanely through nongovernmental groups than it can provide
them itself.18
No sooner had the structures of civil society begun t o be
reappraised, however, than many old fears-and a few new
ones-concerning them began to surface. To many people, the
very idea awakens fears of civil strife, crude majoritarianism,
or the glorification of the group at the expense of the individual. Since I have listed five ways in which communities have
been regarded as undergirding democratic republics, let me
mention five concerns that are most frequently expressed about
them. First, there is the notion that allegiance to what Madison
called faction^"^^ foments civil discord, impedes national cohesion, and threatens the state. Second, to many intellectuals,
the idea of community connotes backwardness and narrowmindedness. A suspicious attitude toward "small town values"
finds support not only among collectivist thinkers (Marx and
Engels wrote scornfully of the "idiocy of rural life"),2° but
among libertarians (John Stuart Mill deplored the stifling ef-

LUTION 333-34 (1992).

17. TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 1, at 93-94; cf. KROPOTRIN, supra note 13.
18. See PETER BERGER& RICHARD J. NEUHAUS,TO EMPOWER
PEOPLE:
ROLEOF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES
IN PUBLIC POLICY(1977); RALPH M. KRAMER,
IN THE WELFARESTATE (1981); BETWEEN
STATESAND MARVOLUNTARY
AGENCIES
KETS: T m VOLUNTARY
SECTOR
IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
(Robert Wuthnow ed.,
1991).
NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison).
19. THE FEDERALIST
KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS,THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 14 (1955).
20.
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fect of "custom" on the free development of gifted individua l ~ )Third,
. ~ ~ the frequent figurative use of the word "community" to designate a whole nation or ethnic group evokes associations of racism and totalitarianism, especially in light of the
atrocities perpetrated in the name of "folkish community"
(Volksgemeinschaft) in the 1930s and 1940s.~~
Fourth, in the
period of increased attentiveness to "universal" individual human rights after World War 11, a heightened consciousness has
arisen concerning the ways in which social subgroups can be
oppressive t o their own members, as well as intolerant of outsiders. Finally, to many people, the current rise of militant
nationalism and fundamentalism in various parts of the world
has seemed to confirm fears associated with group loyalties.
It will be noted that most of those fears are based on concepts of communitarianism that equate it variously with interest-group pluralism, nationalism, or majoritarianism. This
suggests that some refinement of the issues is in order, and
that distinctions must be made not only among particular sorts
of groups, but according to the actual relations among the
state, the market, and the rest of civil society at different periods in history and in different cultural contexts. The debate
about individualism and communitarianism, as the French
reporter points out, is an old one, but it is one whose terms
alter their weight and meanings under different historical
conditions. Depending on the circumstances, the sorts of groups
that in some countries at some phases of historical development promote individual liberty and participatory politics can
operate in other times and places to oppress individuals and to
stifle political life.
In 1989, with society unexpectedly asserting itself against
the state in many parts of the world, the time seemed propitious for the IALS to explore the legal dimensions of these
perennial questions that were taking new forms in political
theory. In particular, it seemed worthwhile to inquire into the
legal status and treatment in various countries of certain especially important social groups-ranging from families, local
ON LIBERTY68 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts
21. JOHN STUARTMILL,
Press 1956) (1859).
22.
National Socialism, like other ideologies claiming community on a grandiose
scale, was in fad hostile to local communities and subcultures which competed
with the state for loyalty. Just as Manr distrusted p u p s that tended to perpetuate "bourgeois vestiges," National Socialists regarded many religious and communal
associations as Reichsfeinde (enemies of the Reich).

GENERALREPORT
schools, churches and neighborhoods, to larger educational,
workplace, religious, and professional associations, and to various kinds of governmental organizations at the local and communal level. The United States seemed to be an ideal setting
for such a conference, for, as Tocqueville had memorably observed, "Better use has been made of association and this powerful instrument of action has been applied to more varied aims
In his travels,
in America than anywhere else in the
he was repeatedly struck by the fact that, "Americans of all
ages, all stations of life, and all types of dispositions, are forever forming association^."^^
Tocqueville marvelled at the variety of associations which
had no obvious political o r commercial object:
There are. . . a thousand different types-religious, moral,
serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large
and very minute. Americans combine to give fetes, found
seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and send missionaries to the antipodes, [to proclaim truths, and t o instill
What made these nonpolitical groups politically significant, so
far as he was concerned, was the array of skills and attitudes
that they fostered. When Americans wanted something built,
repaired, cleaned up, praised, o r propagated, he observed, they
just gathered a group of people together and did it--rather
than appealing t o "a powerful stranger called the government.y'26When you look behind any new undertaking in the
United States, he claimed, "you are sure to find an association,"
whereas "in France you would find the government or in England some territorial [ p ~ t e n t a t e l . " ~ ~
In sum, then, Cole Durham and I were confident that we
had an excellent topic for comparative examination, and one
that was particularly well suited for exploration in an American setting. But when we tried to put our idea in the form of a
proposal to the IALS, we had great difficulty in deciding what

TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 189.
23.
Id. at 513. "[Ehen the women," Tocqueville reported, "often go to public
24.
meetings and forget household cares while they listen to political speeches." Id. at
243. For a description of the rich associational life in certain parts of Europe in
the nineteenth century, see KROPOTKIN, supra note 13, at 223-92.
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 513.
25.
Id. at 93.
26.
Id. at 513.
27.
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t o call it. What made this problem so intractable, however, was
precisely what made it seem promising from an intellectual
point of view. The main reason we could not easily come up
with a title for this conference is that the vocabulary and conceptual apparatus of modern law and politics is primarily
geared to the relations among individuals, the state, and the
market. Legal theory lacks adequate terms and concepts for
grappling with the "thousand different types" of social groups
that provide the immediate context for most people's lives and
that flourish within and among the megastructures of the state
and the market. Since the existence of a mass of material that
does not fit any existing theoretical framework is a classic
invitation t o further research, we regarded the naming problem
as, on balance, a n encouraging sign.
We turned next to neighboring disciplines for aid in framing a title, and settled initially on a shorthand expression with
a venerable pedigree in social theory. The term is "civil society," an expression that was frequently on the lips of oppositionist political figures like Havel, Konrad, and Michnik in the
1 9 8 0 ~Czeslaw
.~~
Milosz, the Nobel Prize-winning Polish poet,
tersely conveyed the spirit in which that term was used when
he wrote in 1986, "Quite contrary t o the predictions of
Marx, . . . instead of the withering away of the state, the
state . . , is eating away the substance of society."29 The destruction of society by the state, according to Milosz, was "the
basic issue of the twentieth century"-and not only in what
were then the socialist countries, but also in the liberal democracies of the West.30But when Cole and I submitted a proposal to the IALS for a colloquium on "Civil Society," the Executive
Committee of the IALS rejected it as likely to be too unfamiliar
or confusing to many people. On reflection, we agreed.
When we went back t o the drawing board, moreover, we
realized that "civil society" was not quite appropriate for what
we had in mind. For "civil society," as Hegel, Marx, and many
contemporary European thinkers, such as Milosz and Havel
have used that term, includes the structures and systems of the
market. But in many countries, the size and power of business
entities has come t o rival the state. Indeed, as Gunther
Teubner points out in the German report, the distinction be28.
29.
30.

ASH, supra note 10, at 48, 191, 203; Havel, supra note ll, at 9-10.
An Interview with Czeslaw Milosz, N.Y.REV. BOOKS, Feb. 27, 1986, at 34.

Id.

3851

GENERAL REPORT

395

tween market and state has become blurred. Those facts
prompted the American sociologist Robert Bellah to offer a n
addendum to Milosz's diagnosis by pointing out that it is not
only the state, .but the market economy, that can take a toll on
the little groups-families,
schools, neighborhoods, and so
on-that compose the 'life-world" of most men, women, and
children.31
For our purposes, then, the term "civil society" was both
underinclusive (because it leaves out small, participatory, governmental bodies, like the New England townships that so
enchanted Tocqueville) and overinclusive (because it includes
huge private organizations and interest groups that are as
inaccessible to participation as large public entities). Taking
our bearings from Tocqueville, we wanted to concentrate, not
on national parties and pressure groups, or on the
megastructures of state and market, but on the smaller social
subsystems whose political significance, according to
Tocqueville, had been generally ignored.
So what to do? There were a number of sociological terms
that came close-intermediate associations, secondary groups,
and mediating structures. We could have gone to political science for a snappy acronym like QUANGOS (quasiautonomous
nongovernmental organizations). But terms like "group" or
"organization" did not capture the porous boundaries and overlapping memberships of associational activity in contemporary
societies. Moreover, as Teubner points out, social subsystems
do not just "mediate" vertically between individuals and the
state. They mediate between political discourse and the discourses of specialized subsystems, and they mediate horizontally with each other. What we really needed was a title that
would convey a sense of the dynamic interactions among
spheres of meaning, as well as of the constantly changing relations among individuals and the various sorts of communities
to which they belong. For a conference title that would evoke
the law's relation to social systems and subsystems in constant
flux and communication, we could have borrowed Teubner's
own term-"autopoietic
law."32 But it is fair to say that

31.
ROBERTBELLAH,The Invasion of the Money World, in REBUILDINGTHE
NEST 227, 228 (David Blankenhorn et al. eds., 1990) (borrowing the term "life
worldu from Jurgen Habermas).
32. Gunther Teubner, Introduction to Autopoietic Law, in AUTOPOIETICLAW: A
TO LAW AND SOCIETY 1 (Gunther Teubner ed. 1988).
NEW APPROACH
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autopoiesis is not yet a household word. So we invited Teubner
to be a reporter, and went on searching for a title.
Finally, we resolved that we could do no better than to
imitate the spirit of the draftsmen of the French Civil Code.
That is, we aimed for a general formulation that we hoped
would be fkcond en cons6quences--one that would make up in
suggestiveness for what it lacked in ~pecificity.~'Our hope,
after all, was not to bind the imaginations of our national reporters, but to kindle them. In that frame of mind, for better or
worse, we settled on "Individualism and Communitarianism in
Contemporary Legal Systems: Tensions and Accommodations."
The project, as we presented it to the national reporters,
was to consider the extent to which the individual or communities (variously defined) are emphasized in specific parts of their
national legal systems. They were asked to trace the ways that
tensions between individualism and communitarianism are
manifested, as well as the ways in which accommodations are
achieved. This was a vein which the Belgian Reporter, MarieTh6r6se Meulders-Klein, had successfully explored in her brilliant comparative studies of family law,34 and thus there was
reason to think that similar investigations in other areas would
be fruitful as well. In particular, we asked the reporters to
consider the legal treatment of five overlapping types of social
environments of great importance in the daily lives of most
individuals: families, local communities, religious organizations, educational institutions, and the world of work (including
workers' and professional associations). In keeping with the
usual IALS practice, we invited the reporters to concentrate
their efforts on as few or as many subtopics as they wished.
On the basis of the reports they produced, it seems clear
that, whatever the defects and ambiguities of the topic, they
did not in the least dampen the creative impulses of the reporters. No doubt this is because the Scientific Director of the
IALS, Petar Sar~evie,secured the participation of a truly remarkable group of scholars. Not only are they among the
world's experts on various branches of the topic, they are all
distinguished comparatists.

33.
Portalis et al., Discours preliminuire, quoted in ~ H U VON
R
MEHREN &
JAMESGORDLEY,
CIVILLAW SYSTEM 54 (2d ed. 1977).
E.g., Marie-Th6rBse Meulders-Klein, Familk, &at et s6curitk Donomique
34.
d'ezistence d la fin du XX&me s&k, in 2 FAMILLE,
$TAT ET S ~ U R $CONOMIQUE
~ T ~
D'EXISTENCE
1077 (Marie-Th6rBse Meulders-Klein & John Eekelaar eds., 1988).
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The national reports disclose a group of countries engaged
in what is, in a sense, a common quest: the search for an optimal relationship between private ordering and public regulation; for a n appropriate balance between individual rights and
the limits on those rights t h a t are required for the sake of life
in an organized society; and for effective methods of responding
to the needs of their citizens without fostering an entitlement
mentality. In most places, however, these goals are being pursued with little attention to specialized social subsystems, or to
forms of private ordering other than market ordering. Most
importantly, the reports demonstrate that the search does not
begin with a clean slate in a mythical state of nature. I t takes
place under specific historical circumstances that importantly
af'fect ideas of what is optimal as well as the possibilities and
means of achieving various political goals.
The tensions and accommodations between individualism
and communitarianism appear in quite a different light, for
example, in a country just emerging from state socialism like
Poland, from the way they manifest themselves in the liberal
welfare republics of Western Europe, or in a country like the
United States, which has only slowly and partially made the
transition from a liberal republic to a liberal welfare republic.
Or again, as Tatsuo Inoue's report illustrates, between a country like Japan where certain structures of civil society are relatively strong and countries where social ties have become more
attenuated.

A. The Transition from Socialism: The Case of Poland
Through the 1970s and 1980s, few people could remain
unmoved and unimpressed by the way in which Polish labor
and religious organizations had been able to preserve and nurture the sparks of a vision of human freedom that stood in
stark opposition to official ideology. According t o the Polish
reporter, however, the adoption of "civil society" as a rallying
cry took place without much "profound theoretical reflection" on
its meaning. Though "the myth of civil society" played a central
role in democratic oppositional thinking in the 1970s and
1980s, he reports that it has more or less faded from view in
the years since 1989.
At present, civil society has taken a back seat to the "most
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important task" of the time, namely, establishing a liberal
social state with constitutional protection for individual and
economic freedom. In this process of transition t o a new form of
government, the legacy of civil society has been overshadowed
by a more recent inheritance-the legacy of socialism. Although
the institutions of civil society, as carriers of democratic humanism (or "bourgeois vestiges7'), may have contributed to the
downfall of state socialism, it now appears far from certain
whether they possess enough vitality t o play a major role in
raising and sustaining a democratic republic. Ironically, the
question now seems to be whether "socialist vestiges" in the
form of habits and attitudes acquired over the past few decades
are strong enough to block efforts at democratic renewal.
Of the acquired habits and attitudes to which the Polish
reporter drew particular attention, one syndrome in particular
e.~~
with its "attracwas anticipated by T ~ c ~ u e v i l l Socialism,
tive set of promises" (guaranteed employment, broad social
safety net) fostered a mentality of dependency and entitlement
that is now in tension with privatization. Another vestige
seems to contradict Tocqueville's expectations. For it appears
that participation in small groups can serve as a distraction
from, rather than as a school for, citizenship in the larger
sense. Paradoxically, "participation" in governing the workplace
may actually have figured in the subordination of employees by
giving them a sense of dignity, of belonging, and a certain feeling of liberty. "There is no doubt," according to the reporter,
"that a worker's participation in the management of an enterprise was a particular compensation for the lack . . . of political
rights and liberties." Participation, i t seems, may or may not be
a means of empowerment, depending on whether the group
that serves as the theater of participation (union, local government) itself has real power, including the ability to set conditions for its own development.
The picture of the current East European scene painted by
the Polish reporter is that of a 'landscape after a battle," with
the "state" under halting construction and "society" in relative
disarray. He observes a "pendulum effect" as governments react
to the extremes of the totalitarian past by promoting relatively
unlimited individualism, especially in the economic sphere,
without sufficient attention to the general welfare. In Poland,
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he notes that the newly constituted state is attempting to create conditions favorable to civil society through laws that delegate power to local communities and provide organizational
frameworks for associations. Yet he provides several examples
that raise substantial doubts about whether this top-down
strategy significantly promotes either decentralization of power
or individual freedom.

B. European Liberal Welfare States
The Polish reporter theorizes that the individualismcommunitarianism discussion is a discourse peculiarly linked to
the democratic liberal (rule-of-law) state, where political theory
in principle rules out the notion that either one ism or the
other should prevail. The idea that neither individualism nor
communitarianism should predominate as a matter of principle
does in fact seem to be part of the historical and philosophical
inheritance of the liberal welfare states of the European continent. But that idea is less clearly a feature of American and
Japanese political thought and practice. In fact, the American
and Japanese reports suggest that a certain emphasis in principle on individualism (in the former case) or communitarianism
(in the latter) is generally regarded as compatible with liberal
democracy in those countries. Not surprisingly, these differences in emphasis seem to be attributable in large measure to the
different cultural contexts within which democratic experiments have been introduced. I t is not only in the emerging
democracies of Eastern Europe where vestiges of the past cast
long shadows on, and limit the possibilities of, the present.
The French and Belgian reports are the most consistent
with the Polish reporter's general observation. The French
reporter remarks that "the idea today is to attack excesses of
both [individualism and communitarianism], and to protect the
sacrosanct human rights (which are primarily individual
rights) without compromising the interests of society." He relates these attitudes to the inheritance of the French Revolution, pointing out that excessive liberty, especially in the economic sphere, can run counter to another revolutionary ideal:
equality. I t is generally accepted today, he writes, that individual rights are not absolute, but are subject to certain limits imposed by collective interests and by the requirements of life in
society. Accepted, too, is collective responsibility for an increasing number of risks, manifested in the appearance alongside
traditional political and civil rights of new types of "social"
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rights-to employment, education, health care, and so on.
The spirit of the French Revolution enters into the French
and Belgian reports (and has affected much of continental
Europe) in yet another way. The institutions of civil society
were particular targets of attack in the revolutionary period.
All the corps interddiaires of the old r e g i m e t h e family, the
Church, craft guilds and associations-were to be dismantled.
Under the slogan "No intermediaries between citizen and
state," revolutionary legislation introduced divorce, broke up
landed estates, confiscated church property, and abolished the
guilds. For Tocqueville's French readers, that experience was
the silent term of comparison in his admiring description of
American "intellectual and moral associations." When he wrote
of American families and religious groups, Tocqueville was
wrestling with the question of what social supports would be
available to sustain the effort to construct a free, egalitarian,
democratic polity in his own country. In extolling the virtues of
the New England township, he was lamenting the virtual destruction of local and communal government in France.
Though the family quickly regained legislative favor in the
postrevolutionary period, and workers' associations gradually
achieved legitimacy later on, the powerful myth of la nation,
une et indivisible still casts a cloud of suspicion over groups
that might compete with the state for allegiance. Over the
nineteenth century, as the French reporter points out, the
structures of civil society continued to develop-some organized
by the state; some encouraged by the state; some ignored and
tolerated by the state; some with legal personality, others without. In the current period, he calls attention to efforts at decentralization in administrative law, and to the proliferation of
powerful interest and pressure groups-groups that awaken old
fears associated with what Rousseau called "partial societie~."~~
The ambiguous roles of powerful economic and political
associations in the polity are of special interest to the German
reporter. He maintains that "today a new political arrangement
between the state and private organizations is emerging-which I would call 'polycorporatism.' " Polycorporatism,
according to Teubner, is characterized by a symbiosis between
the public and private sectors, with government agencies and
36.
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private-sector actors cooperating in various ways, with governmental decision-making power to some extent dispersed, and
with group autonomy to some extent sacrificed. He theorizes
that a new kind of "polycorporate state" has come into being-taking the form, in Germany, of political parties, plus-on
the one hand-a network of governmental bureaucracies that
have sloughed off (privatized) much of the responsibility for
policymaking, and-on the other hand-a network of nongovernmental organizations that have acquired quasigovernmental
powers and duties.
As for the smaller-scale associations that were of special
interest to Tocqueville, let us now turn to the Belgian report on
European family law and the French and German reports on
the world of work.

I . Individualism and communitarianism i n family law
In family law, as in other areas, legislators do not write on
a social tabula rasa. The Belgian reporter's comparative essay
emphasizes the profound effects that history and philosophy
have had on the divergent understandings of the individual
and the family (and, one might add, of law and the state) that
are operating in the Anglo-American and Romano-Germanic
legal traditions. The significance of those differences extends
far beyond family law; their spirit penetrates every corner of
the respective legal systems. Thus the Belgian reporter's survey
of comparative family law sheds light on many issues that
recur in the legal treatment of local communities, schooling,
religion, and the world of work.
One feature that distinguishes the continental European
family laws from the Anglo-American is their relative emphasis
on the group as such. It was in family law where French revolutionary assaults on intermediate groups were most shortlived. To Portalis, the chief draftsman of the Civil Code of 1804,
the family (the legitimate family defined in the civil law) was
the basis of civil society: "It is the cradle of the state, and the
domestic virtues are civic virtues." The French Civil Code (and
most other European civil codes) established a highly detailed
system of rights and duties among family members, animated
by a principle of "solidarity." The Belgian reporter remarks,
T h e continental jurist is in fact astonished at the relative
absence throughout the history of the common law of rules of
substantive law organizing family relations as such . . . ."
Despite recent transformations in family behavior and
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ideas about family life, especially since the 1960s, the Belgian
reporter fmds that continental European law (with the exception of most of the Nordic countries) still maintains something
of the ideal of family solidarity. She acknowledges the appearance, alongside traditional ideas of family solidarity, of a
"postmodern" family ideology that regards the group as merely
in the service of its individual members as they pursue their
separate aims. She notes, as well, the increasing challenges to
traditional legal concepts of family life from unmarried and
same-sex couples pressing for legal recognition. She wonders
whether the increased emphasis on children's rights may be
the entering wedge of a new form of individualism in continental family law. Nevertheless, she finds that, in responding t o
these challenges, the Romano-Germanic legal systems so far
"have evolved in a manner that conforms to their own traditions." Thus, for example, obligations of family solidarity have
been broadened to include children born outside legal marriage,
but unmarried couples a s such have not achieved a legal status
equivalent to the status of marriage.
She discerns similar tensions and accommodations in public law. Though most European constitutions expressly recognize the family as a social institution that must be accorded
special protection by the state, there is vigorous controversy
over the definition of the family and over the relation of family
protection to the individual rights that are protected in the
same documents. European legislatures, however, have managed t o reach a variety of pragmatic accommodations of competing values. Confronted with considerable diversity in contemporary sexual and family behavior, the continental welfare
states have attempted t o steer a course that provides assistance to persons in need without creating new legal statuses
and without penalizing families that are based on marriage.
The same overall accommodationist trends are manifested
in the activities of supranational European institutions. The
European Social Charter engages the member nations t o protect the family by setting conditions for its flourishing (plein
epanouissement). Protection of the family must be accomplished, however, within the context of the norms established
by the European Convention on Human Rights. As the Belgian
reporter points out, there is a certain internal tension in ECHR
Article 8's limited protection of the right to "respect for private
and familial life." The right to respect for private life concerns
the individual alone, while the right to respect for familial life
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concerns both the individual and society (society's interest in
the family is explicitly recognized in many constitutions and
international instruments). On the basis of recent decisions by
the European Court of Human Rights, however, the reporter
concludes that the tension can be alleviated, though not eliminated, by treating the notions of private life and family life as
complementary.
The task, as she sees it, is to work out, under modern
circumstances, "a carefully thought-through equilibrium between individual rights and duties, but also between individual
interests and the general welfare, including the welfare of the
family, less as an institution, than as a fragile and vulnerable
human community." Her analysis, highly nuanced and attentive to numerous trouble spots, comports with the observations
of the Polish and French reporters: at least within the vision of
liberal democracy that prevails in continental Western Europe,
neither individualism nor communitarianism is permitted to
predominate as a matter of principle.
2. The world of work

The French report depicts a legal system that appears at
fxst glance to be supportive of organized labor in myriad ways.
France has moved so far from its former hostility to workers'
associations that the reporter can now speak of "the unceasing
extension of powers granted to unions." This legislative trend
has been accompanied, moreover, with a fm commitment to
union autonomy in the form of a "remarkable abstention" from
intervention in the internal affairs of unions. This commitment
has weathered many shifts in regime and ideology.
Paradoxically, however, unionism in France is more sharply in decline than in other European countries. The decline is
so severe that the reporter describes the situation as reaching a
critical threshold. The organized sector has dropped to about 10
percent of the entire labor force, and to only 5.6 percent of
private sector employees. How is one to account for this state of
affairs? The reporter observes: ",If French unions today are
facing real difficulties, this is certainly not because the State
has denied them means of action: on the contrary, the law has
constantly extended their prerogatives." Moreover, he adds, the
public authorities increasingly include the unions along with
other groups within the framework of social "partnership."
Among the causes of the decline of unionism, the French
reporter particularly emphasizes that loss of confidence by the
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rank-and-file in their leaders has led to apathy and disaffection. With bureaucratization, internal divisions, and excessive
politicization, union officials have grown out of touch with their
members. The French reporter notes, too, that there is less of a
contradiction than may fist appear between the increasing
integration of the unions into the apparatus of the state and
the unions' loss of influence with the majority of workers. The
German reporter agrees, describing the symbiosis between
government and "big interest organizations" as creating a "shift
in the legitimation gap9'-with the burden of enforcing and
explaining policy decisions now falling on the cooperating organizations rather than on public officials.
At another level, the French reporter notes that declining
confidence by employees in the benefits of collective action
reflects many of the same .social attitudes that are associated
with changes in family behavior.
In the world of work there is, quite evidently, a phenomenon
of withdrawal into oneself that is the sign of an increasingly
splintered and divided society. Everyone thinks that it is in
his interest t o fend for himself and strives only to promote his
personal aspirations: this marks the end of the famous "worker solidaritynof the heyday of unionism in former times. The
unions today have fewer and fewer "militantsn and more and
more "clients," who look to them only for the satisfaction of
their immediate interests and abandon them as soon as they
no longer find them necessary.

Certain well-intentioned legislative measures also may
have played a role in the decline of unionism. Has the French
state, in a sense, arrogated to itself many of the roles that
unions in other nations perform? By extensively regulating
numerous aspects of wages, hours, and working conditions that
in other countries are left to the collective bargaining process,
the state may have undermined the unions' traditional functions and encouraged them to transform themselves into lobbying and pressure groups.
Whatever the explanation, the French reporter does not
hesitate to characterize the current situation as dangerous.
Workers have become increasingly dependent for protection on
the vicissitudes of politics and the market, while employers and
society in general are increasingly vulnerable to "spontaneous
eruptions" of discontent. A stable democratic regime, he concludes, not only needs unions, but needs them to be strong and
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independent enough t o perform their roles effectively and to
merit the confidence of workers.

C. A Liberal Welfare State with Emphasis on the Individual:
The Case of the United States
The propositions about individualism and communitarianism that the French reporter describes as generally accepted
are actually more controversial in the United States than in
continental Europe. In America, although the frontier has long
vanished, the myth of the self-reliant, lonely, proud, individual
still exerts a powerful influence on culture and law. That myth
contributes to the distinctive character of American family law
and labor law, and helps to explain the late and reluctant
American acceptance of the welfare state. I t is worth recalling
that a t the time of the American Founding, four-fifths of the
nonslave population was self-employed in family farms and
busines~es.~'Most of the descendants of those independent
artisans and farmers-along with successive waves of immigrants--eventually joined the ranks of wage-earners. But their
inherited cultural values constituted a significant obstacle to
the development of worker solidarity in the United States.38
American wage earners "grew up in a society which stressed
the ideals of classlessness, individual initiative, and opportunity.'739

1. Family law
From the perspective of the Belgian reporter, Anglo-Amencan family law "seems to bear the mark of a profoundly individualistic philosophy, hostile to official normative or judicial
interference in private and familial matters." She lists certain
features of Anglo-American family law that are particularly
surprising to continental observers: the absence, i n most jurisdictions, of the concept of a marital property regime; the absence of clear rules concerning the obligations of parents toward children; the absence of support obligations outside the
nuclear family; the liberty to change one's name and the ab37. Robert Heilbroner, Boom and Crash, NEW YORKER,Aug. 28, 1978, at 52,
68.
38. See Alice Kessler-Harris, Trade Unions Mirror Society in Conflict Between
LAB. REV., Aug. 1987, at 32.
Collectivism and Individualism, MONTHLY
39. Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Laws, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1394, 1403 (1971).
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sence of "family names"; and the relative freedom of testation
that prevails in common law countries. In sum, many of the
legal expressions of "solidarity" that are so prominent in civil
law systems are completely lacking in Anglo-American family
Where federal laws and programs affecting family life are
concerned, the passing observation of the Belgian reporter that
"family associations" are among the most important interest
groups on the European political scene may help to explain
certain aspects of American distinctiveness. Originally formed
with a pronatalist bent in response t o the population losses
inflicted by World War I, large broad-based European family
associations have evolved into powerful lobbies for child-raising
families.41 These groups, which have no counterpart in the
United States, have played important roles in the political
processes that have produced family allowances, maternity
leaves, family housing subsidies, and other protective measures
in Europe. Of equal importance, they have assured continuous
high national visibility for family issues. In the United States,
though many interest groups claim to represent women or to
speak for children, there is no organized voice for parents. The
fact that so much of family law is state law, moreover, has kept
some issues (like divorce reform) from receiving a full national
airing.
Further contrasts appear between the United States and
continental Europe when family protection clashes with individual liberty in the area of fundamental rights. Unlike most
European constitutions, the American Constitution contains no
mention of the family. Family protection has gained recognition
as a constitutional value in certain Supreme Court decisions,
but only sporadically.42Individual rights, of course, are welldeveloped in American constitutional law. The Belgian reporter
has rendered a service by illuminating the nuanced, but signifi-

40.
But see Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
865 (1989) for a discussion of some specifically legal reasons for the absence of
solidaristic norms, as well as of the ways in which Anglo-American family law does
hold up family solidarity as an ideal. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
41.
See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY,
DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 425
(1972).
See generally Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kin42.
ship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 l)rlICH.
L. REV. 463 (1983).
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cant, differences in the understandings of human personhood
that can inform the concept of the "individual" where fundamental rights are concerned. Legal norms and policy choices
cannot help but be affected by whether, as in the American
legal system, the individual tends to be imagined as autonomous and self-determining, or, as in the Romano-Germanic
systems, as constituted in important ways by and through his
relations with others.
It must be stressed, however, that these differences,
though significant, are differences mainly of emphasis and
degree. The legal systems of continental Western Europe, like
the American system, assign a high priority to the free development of the autonomous individual. They accord somewhat
greater attention than the United States legal system does,
though, to the social contexts, including the family, within
which that development takes place. Thus, for example, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights treat the
individual's right to private life as protecting a sphere for his
f d and free development, yet they do so within the limits expressly mentioned in Article 8, and with recognition that privacy rights are implicitly conditioned by other rights protected in
the Convention. The United States Supreme Court, by contrast,
tends to envision privacy as "a right to be let alone,"43and as
a species of individual liberty that trumps a wide range of
other social values.

2. Legal treatment of religious associations
The American report is the only one of the national reports
to give more than passing attention t o the subject of individualism and communitarianism in the legal treatment of religious
associations. The comparative approach of the report, however,
is especially illuminating in this complex and paradoxical area.
Individualism and communitarianism are intertwined in the
religion language of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which protects the free exercise of religion and forbids the
federal government to make any law respecting the establishment of religion. The establishment language seems t o have
been intended t o prevent the national government from interfering with the diverse state and local arrangements concern-

43.
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ing religious exercise. Those arrangements at the time of the
Founding ranged from disestablishment to official state establishments, with various cooperative accommodations in between.44 Until the 1940s, the federal government remained
almost entirely aloof from religious liberty issues. The most
notable exception, resulting in denial of constitutional protection to religious polygyny, occurred because Utah was not a
sovereign state, but a territory under federal jurisdiction.
In the mid-twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court
began to make parts of the Bill of Rights, including the religion
language, binding on the states. In that process, an individualistic approach prevailed in two respects: (1) Religion was repeatedly characterized in Court opinions as a purely private
individual experience; and (2) The Court's understanding of
free exercise, with some exception^:^ ignored the fact that for
many individuals religious freedom has important associational
and institutional aspects. At the root of these understandings
seems to be the implicit concept of the human person noted by
the Belgian reporter in the family context: the autonomous,
freely choosing, self-constituting individual. The result of neglecting the social dimension of human personhood has been a
bias against individuals and groups for whom free exercise of
religion is not merely a private affair but inseparable from
participation in a worshipping community.
The Court's expansive concept of what it means to officially
"establish" religion, moreover, has impeded legislative experiments with creative use of mediating structures to deliver social services. The tendency of the establishment decisions is
either to exclude religious associations from such programs or
to allow them t o participate only at the price of checking their
religious beliefs at the door.46
Nowhere has the influence of the Court's excessively narrow view of free exercise and its inflated concept of establishment been more apparent than in the cases involving education. Here, American law has had important effects on the
associations that serve as schools for citizenship and seedbeds
of civic virtue. The education cases involve not only schools, but
free exercise rights of individuals, freedom of religious associa-

Wallace v. J&ee, 472 U.S.38, 99 n.4 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Notably, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.205 (1972).
That is the practical effect of the "entanglement" prong of the test in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.602 (1971).
44.
45.
46.
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tion, and the ability of families to control the education of their
children. As the law presently stands, the government-run
schools are required t o be rigorously secular, while parents who
desire to protect their children from governmental indoctrination that is profoundly at odds with their religious convictions
can do so only if they can afford private education. The American report performs a valuable service by showing that other
pluralistic liberal democracies have found means to accord
equal respect to believers and nonbelievers without banishing
religion entirely from public educational settings or without
denying public assistance t o families who experience those
settings as an assault on their deepest values. Ironically, the
American legal treatment of religious groups resembles the
stance of pre-1989 socialist countries more than it does the
tolerant approaches of the other liberal democracies to which
we ordinarily compare ourselves.

D. A Liberal Welfare State with Emphasis on the Group:
The Case of Japan
The Japanese report, like the American, reveals an asymmetric balance between individualism and communitarianism,
but with a tendency to resolve the tensions in the opposite way.
The reporter describes Japanese society as "basically an intricate web of various intermediary communities each of which
has a tenacious hold on the lives of its individual members and
a relatively strong group autonomy vis-a-vis the state, i.e., the
ability to maintain its internal order by extralegal and informal
sanctions." If the American reporter (and American General
Reporter) tend to take the degree of individual liberty they
enjoy for granted while expressing concern about its extremes,
the Japanese reporter, coming from the opposite starting point,
confidently assumes "the communitarian character of contemporary Japanese society" and warns of the consequences of
overemphasis on the group. Yet it does not seem that Japanese
communitarianism is characterized by associational activity in
the Tocquevillean sense.
The Japanese reporter draws his principal illustrations of
Japanese communitarianism and its excesses from the world of
work. The enterprise (kaisha),he states, has become the principal community, o r life-world, of many Japanese. It is "the most
vigorous and dominant form of intermediary community in
Japan today." The reporter vividly describes how the world of
work-with its classlessness, its high degree of job security,
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and its close cooperation between labor and management--has
absorbed and deflected the energies and loyalties of many individuals from other spheres of existence.
The Japanese word kaishashugi ("company-ism") designates the set of habits and attitudes that are associated with
such highly absorptive occupational activity. That spirit often
has been credited with a major role in Japan's economic success:' Recently, however, kaishashugi has also been implicated in the phenomenon of karoshi--death from overwork, or,
more precisely, death from diseases such as stroke and heart
disease that are associated with a high degree of physical and
psychological stress. Making imaginative use of Durkheim's
analysis of the fundamental sociological causes of suicides, the
Japanese reporter theorizes that instances of karoshi are not
just isolated individual tragedies, but also revealing indicators
of broader social conditions: "[Karoshi] symbolizes the tension
and distress of a communitarian society"-not of the premodern
sort, but of a new "hyperindustrialized and secularized"
communitarian society.
Though the English language has no equivalent word, the
phenomenon of karoshi has also been documented in the United States. A recent study shows that the working hours of the
average American employee have risen steadily over the past
twenty years, an increase that has affected nearly all workers
across the entire spectrum of industries and o~cupations:~In
the manufacturing sector, an American worker now puts in the
equivalent in hours of eight work-weeks more per year than his
or her French or German counterpart, and eleven work-weeks
more than a Swedish worker.49(Japanese manufacturing and
office employees work even harder, putting in the equivalent of
Accordalmost six weeks more each year than A~nericans.~~)
ing to Juliet Schor, "Americans are literally working themselves to death-as jobs contribute t o heart disease, hypertension, gastric problems, depression, exhaustion, and a variety of
other ailments."51 Schor blames the increase in overwork in

47. See, in addition to the Japanese report, Ezra 3'. Vogel, Japan: Adaptive
Comrmcniturianism, in IDEOLOGY AND NATIONAL
COMPETITIVENESS: AN ANALYSIS OF
NINE COUNTRIES 141 (George C. Lodge & Ezra F. Vogel eds., 1987).
DECLINE
48. JULIET B. SCHOR, W OVERWORKEDAMERICAN:THE UNEXPECTED
OF LEISURE
1-2 (1991).
49. Id. at 2, 153.
50. Id. at 153-54.
51. Id. at 11.
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the United States chiefly on the inherent tendency of capitalist
economies to generate strong pressures for long working hours.
She attributes the difference between the United States and
Western Europe to American consumerism and a relatively
weak union movement.52 Her analysis raises the question of
the extent to which Japanese overwork, too, may be mainly the
result of the imperatives of the capitalist economy, aggravated
by Japanese communitarianism, largely unchecked by the cooperative Japanese labor unions.53 It seems s i w c a n t that in
Europe, trade unions and labor-oriented parties have made the
reduction of work time a major priority, have successfully
fought for increased leisure time for employees," and have
joined forces with family associations to secure the passage of
maternity and family-leave laws.
In the view of the Japanese reporter, Japanese
communitarianism, as manifested above all in the workplace,
but also in local community life and in the schools, has exacted
too high a price from the individual. Precisely contrary to the
American situation as presented by the American reporter and
the General Reporter, he states that in Japan individual rights
"are chronically endangered by the overgrowth andlor overprotection of intermediary communities."
I t is M i c u l t t o discern from the Japanese report, however,
the precise status of small-scale noncommercial associations.
The report describes one group, the kaisha, as "dominant," and
other subgroups as relatively insular. The reporter writes of
the need for "a richer form of human communality," and calls
for a better balance among various communal spheres. If the
kaisha absorbs most of a person's participatory energy and
sense of social responsibility, he points out, not only will family
life suffer, but s o will local communal life.
And, as Francis Fukuyama points out, there will be a toll
on democratic government as well.55 Fukuyama, whose account of Japanese emphasis on the group comports well with
the description provided by the Japanese reporter, states, "The
most significant challenge being posed t o the liberal universal-

52.
Id. at 6, 9, 163.
See id. at 6, 9.
53.
Id. at 81-82.
54.
55.
Fukuyama writes of the "muting of democratic 'politics' " in a society such
as Japan where "[tlhe emphasis on group harmony tends to push open confrontation to the fringes of politics." FUKWAMA,supm note 13, at 239-40.
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ism of the American and French revolutions today is . . . [corning] from those societies in Asia which combine liberal econo'~~
mies with a kind of paternalistic a u t h ~ r i t a r i a n i s m . ~That
particular hybrid (paternalistic capitalism), which Fukuyama
describes as "perhaps never before seen in hi~tory,"~'seems
actually to be in tension with a Tocquevillean communitarianism of flourishing local associations. We glimpse that tension in the Japanese reporter's account of the Christian widow
who was not permitted to designate her husband's final resting
place.
Thus, just as many Americans have concluded that the
individual is jeopardized by excesses of individualism, the Japanese reporter concludes that authentic "human communality"
is impoverished by a distorted communal structure. "Our communality flourishes in its fullness only if we foster and sustain
our multiple belongingness to the different layers o r spheres of
our communal life, from family and friendship to occupational,
religious and various voluntary associations to local, ethnic,
national, and global communities."

LAWAND SOCIAL
ECOLOGY
IV. CONCLUSIONS:
Despite differing historical legacies and cultural settings, all
the liberal democracies represented here are wrestling with
certain common problems. In all of their legal systems, what
Sir Henry Maine wrote a century and a half ago seems to hold
true today, though in varying degrees:
The movement of progressive societies has been uniform in
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished
by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the
growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is
steadily substituted for the Family as the unit of which the
civil laws take account.58

A generation after Maine remarked on the emergence of the
free, self-determining individual from the confining network of
family and group ties, Max Weber raised the question of
whether that movement was but a passage into another sort of
confinement-the "iron cage" of a rationalized and bureaucratized society.59Today, individualism, rationalization (special56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 238.
Id. at 235.
HENRY
MAINE,ANCIENTLAW 139-40 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861).
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ETHICAND THE SPIRITOF CAPITALISM
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ized division of labor), bureaucratization, and th.e market economy can be seen to have exacted a significant toll on personal,
social, and political life. As families and other communities of
memory and mutual aid have become weaker, the individual
has become more liberated, but also more vulnerable. In the
developed nations today, a n individual's economic security and
social standing are decreasingly determined by his family and
increasingly fixed by his occupation (or, if he is not employed,
by his dependence on governmental large~se).~'As a result,
unprecedented proportions of the population in liberal democracies are dependent on large bureaucratic organizations of one
form or another. The contrast is great with the situation in
many parts of the less-developed world where a n individual's
status and security are still highly dependent on kinship ties
and group alliances.
In most of Europe, though, the processes remarked by
Maine and Weber were already well-advanced in the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, Emile Durkheim,
who shared Tocqueville's belief i n the importance of
associational life, asserted that local communities, religious
groups, and families were in irreversible decline. He wrote,
"[Tlhe bonds attaching us [to communities] become daily more
fragile and more slack.'"jl Religions, he thought, were losing
much of their authority and effectiveness, while families were
becoming "just a number of individuals united by bonds of mutual affe~tion."~~
As Durkheim explained it:
Once, when each local environment was more or less closed to
others by usages, traditions, the scarcity of communications,
each generation remained perforce in its place of origin or at
least could not move far form it. But as these barriers vanish,
as these small environments are levelled and blended with
one another, the individuals inevitably disperse in accordance
with their ambitions and to further their interests into the
wider space now open to them.63

The most promising theater for associational activity that re-

(Talcott Parsons trans., 1930).
See MARY ANN GLENDON,TIE NEW FAMILYAND THE NEW PROPERTY 1-2
60.
(1981).
DuRKHEIM, supra note 13, at 27.
61.
EMILE DURKHEIM,
SUICIDE 377-78 (John A. Spaulding & George Simpson
62.
trans., Free Press 1966) (1897).
Id. at 378.
63.
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mained in the modern world, according to Durkheim, was the
world of work. The only intermediate groups that seemed to
him capable of providing social cohesion and meeting the needs
of individuals for fellowship were "occupational associations"-by which he meant, not labor unions or enterprises as
such, but groups of individuals who cooperate in the same
profession, trade, or o c ~ u p a t i o n . ~ ~
I t seems significant that more of the National Reporters
chose t o address the world of work than any other aspect of the
conference topic. Their gravitation toward that subject should
not be surprising, for in the nations represented here the business world and the workplace have become the primary social
arenas. As Durkheim foresaw, these are the places where many
men and women now spend most of their waking hours, where
they meet and talk with others, and where they form many of
their opinions and values. Unfortunately, the workplace also
seems to be draining more and more of the energies that men
and women might devote elsewhere-to raising their children
or to participating in civic life.
Though Durkheim was prescient about the centrality of
occupational life, he seems not t o have realized how vulnerable
it, too, would be to the modernizing forces that weakened other
social groups. No form of associational life could remain untouched by the processes of rationalization and bureaucratization, or by the geographical, social, and economic mobility that
characterizes all modern and modernizing societies in varying
degrees. Moreover, the fraying of one set of connections seemed
to produce stresses and breaks in the others. Just as families,
schools, churches, small businesses, union locals, and community associations can synergistically reinforce one another, weaknesses in each can undermine the fragile ecology on which all
depend.
The principal question that emerges from the reports is
whether the weakening of communities of memory and mutual
aid should be regarded as a kind of "environmental problem."
After all, is this erosion of small social environments not simply the inevitable consequence of the inexorable advance of modernity? Is it not just a necessary step in the movement to
universal liberal democracy that some have called the end of
history?65On these points, the far-sighted Tocqueville pointed
64.
65.
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out that it matters a good deal what kind of democracy comes
into being: the democratic project might fulfil the hopes of humankind for equality in liberty or it might lead, in certain
circumstances, to equality in servitude.66 He maintained that
the health of small social subsystems is important to the health
of the world's diverse experiments in democratic government.
But does that claim hold up under contemporary circumstances? Some of the most visible and powerful voluntary associations in the modern world are those through which special
interests circumvent or distort democratic processes. Moreover,
if the sorts of associations that Tocqueville had in mind remain
small enough t o command the enthusiasm and involvement of
their members, they are apt to be ineffective in modern politics.
Nevertheless, a persuasive case can still be made for the
proposition that individual freedom, the rule of law, the welfare
state, and healthy markets all depend in crucial ways on the
condition of the fine texture of civil society. Regimes of rights,
democratic governments, systems of entitlements, and market
ordering all silently depend on habits, practices, and attitudes
that are nurtured in nonmarket and nonpolitical institutions.
Effective protection for individual rights requires citizens who
are willing to respect the rights of others even at some cost to
themselves. Genuine democracy requires a citizenry capable of
participating in civic life, as well as men and women willing to
devote some of their skills to public service. A workable welfare
state needs citizens with enough fellow feeling to reach out to
others in need, but with enough sense of responsibility to assume substantial control over their own lives. The market
economy depends on a certain work ethic, as well as a network
of social understandings and practices that permit reliable
planning and promote the security of transactions. The
pluralistic nature of most societies requires, in addition, citizens who are able to respect and appreciate the cultural, ethnic, and religious heritage of others.
Neither historical nor comparative investigation has unearthed examples of institutions that can take the place of
families, neighborhoods, and workplace and religious associations as places where these skills and virtues can be generated,
shaped, transformed, and transmitted from one generation to
the next. Thus, paradoxically, liberal democratic welfare states

66.
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seem to require the maintenance in their midst of value-generating institutions that are not necessarily organized on liberal
p r i n ~ i p l e s .Yet,
~ ~ perversely, the liberal state and the free
market seem to undermine the social supports upon which they
rest. As Fukuyama puts it, "Liberal principles have had a corrosive effect on the values predating liberalism that are needed
to sustain strong communities, and thereby on a liberal
society's ability to be self-s~staining.'~~
The analogies to unrestrained consumption of the world's once-abundant natural
resources are suggestive
But if we are in the presence of a species of environmental
problem involving endangered social resources, to what extent,
if at all, can lawyers as such contribute to improvements? How
could law help to maintain or bring about a better balance in
the complex ecology of state, civil society, market economy, and
individual rights? What would an optimal balance look like? By
what standards could it be measured? Can government protect
the relative autonomy of social subsystems without promoting
their excesses? Can it regulate them without co-opting or destroying them? Do we even know how t o avoid harm to social
environments while carrying out seemingly unrelated governmental activities? Merely to pose such questions is to realize
the primitive state of our knowledge about the ways in which
the legal system intersects with the criss-crossing networks of
associations and relationships that constitute the fine grain of
society, and about the efficacy and limits of law in general.
Nevertheless, the reports document the emergence of various sorts of what might be called "social environmental law."
The Belgian reporter remarks that, 'What is interesting above
all i s the extent to which measures [affecting families] tend to
be preventive as well as reparatory and that they attempt to
associate families and the state in complementary roles, especially in their efforts to reconcile family responsibilities and
occupational life." Polish administrative law, French employment law, and German Codetermination law illustrate various
efforts to establish frameworks and set conditions for organizational life by top-down regulation. The idea that a flourishing

67.
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organizational life might be more effectively promoted by refraining from direct regulation, and by trying to set conditions
for self-government from the bottom-up, characterizes older
American, and some newer French, labor law. An ecological
approach is also noted by the Belgian reporter in European
family policies that consciously address family environments-housing law, tenant protection, zoning, etc. Several
countries are experimenting with the idea that using nongovernmental organizations to deliver social services may not only
be more economical, effective, and humane than direct governmental action, but might also promote the vitality of the organizations concerned.
As the epigraph from Tocqueville a t the outset of this General Report reminds us, the problems treated a t this conference
tend to escape the notice of those whose eyes are trained on
large economic and political systems. In the century and a half
since Tocqueville called attention t o the political importance of
small-scale associations, they have remained more or less neglected in legal and political theory. Thus it seems no small
accomplishment that the national reports presented here provide us with a fuller picture of their legal existence. It is worth
noting that the word "paradox" recurs so frequently in the
national reports. That is a sign, not only of the difficulties the
reporters encountered with a n awkward and unfamiliar topic,
but of the opportunities for further comparative research. For
paradox may be the very stimulus that can move legal science
from what the German reporter has called "the comforting
twilight of closure and openness, separation and interwovenness, autonomy and interdependen~e"~~
into the sunlit
world of experiencing, understanding, judging, and acting."'
The great question is how, precisely, does one make that
move? The reports confirm that comparative methods can help
us to see issues and problems that may not be picked up by
other research strategies; and to make connections that may
remain invisible to those who confine themselves t o the settled
categories of a single national legal system. I t is no coincidence
that i t was a foreign visitor to Jacksonian America who was
able to acquaint generations of American and European read-

Gunther Teubner, The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13
REV. 1443, 1444 (1992).
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ers with aspects of their own respective cultures that are so
familiar as to escape attention. But the question remains
whether comparative methods, after taking us deep into the
twisted labyrinths of law, behavior, and attitudes, can also help
to lead us out of them? Or do they merely sweep us into a dizzying spiral where everything is both cause and effect; different
from, but similar to, everything else; separate but intertwined;
constituted by and constitutive of everything else; and so on? A
sojourn in the disorienting twilight-zone of postmodernism
might well make one long for von Jhering's "Heaven of Conceptual Jurisprudence" with its hairsplitting machines and interpretation presses.71
Teubner puts his finger on the problem when he points out
that fancy legal and social theory in recent years has often lost
track of what is distinctively legal, which in turn has made it
difficult for theorists to develop any coherent concept of the
relations between social and legal phenomena.72To move beyond that impasse is likely to require patient empirical work, a
good ear for "the multiplicity of social discourse^,"^^ and a
high tolerance for interdisciplinary cooperation. Comparatists
cannot claim a monopoly on these qualities, but their traditional strengths do assure that they will have much t o contribute to basic research in law. So far as practical applications are
concerned, the liberal democracies seem to be entering an era
of experiments with new divisions of labor among larger and
smaller public and private structures-at local, national, and
international levels. Again, comparatists do not hold the patent
on knowledge about forms of federalism and subsidiarity, but
they will have much to contribute to, and learn from, these
efforts to give bureaucracy a human face.
No doubt, comparative law will remain unappealing to
scholars in search of clear-cut solutions, quick fixes, or rapid
career advancement. On the other hand, legal fashions do
change. It is not inconceivable that someday law schools may
once again invite students to submit to a hard apprenticeship
in a difficult discipline, and that such an invitation may be
accepted. If so, comparative law presumably will garner its
share of apprentices. I was impressed, in this connection, by an
observation of the Polish reporter, Miroslaw Wyrzykowski.
71.
72.
73.
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Warning that it is unreasonable to expect liberal democracy to
rise full-blown from the ruins of socialism, Professor
Wyrzykowski alluded to Moses' forty-year pilgrimage from
slavery in Egypt to the promised land. The story is a n especially appropriate one to recall on this occasion, for the American
Comparative Law Society and the International Association of
Legal Science are just entering their forties. To my mind, the
most poignant detail of the biblical account of the wanderings
of Israel in the desert is that Moses himself never entered the
promised land, but only glimpsed i t from afar.74 And so it is
with the journeys we undertake in any serious form of research. From time to time, we have glimpses that lift our
hearts and gladden our spirits, but the pilgrimage continues.

74.
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